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The inevitability of change in
Chinese and Indian automakers’ low
cost productive models
Martin Krzywdinski, Grzegorz Lechowski and Ulrich Jürgens
 
Introduction
1 Low-cost  production  strategies  are  reshaping  automotive  markets  in  emerging
economies.  In  recent  times,  both  domestic  producers  and  established  multinational
companies operating in countries like China or India have intensified their efforts to
design  and  produce  “good-enough”  cars  affordable  for  broader  groups  of  local
consumers.  These  new  product  strategies  are  the  carmakers’  response  to  a  rapidly
changing demand structure. While the average incomes in the emerging countries are
still well below the developed societies’ levels, the formers’ domestic middle classes have
grown  and  seen  their  purchasing  power  significantly  increased  during  the  last  two
decades (for China and India see: Nag, 2015; Wang, 2015). This has created new market
segments for relatively higher-quality,  but  – by international  standards – still  rather
inexpensive cars.
2 In  the  present  paper,  we  take  a  closer  look  at  the  productive  models  developed  in
response to these market and societal changes by indigenous carmakers from two key
emerging countries: India and China. As indicated in the literature (Brandt & Thun, 2010),
such  domestic  firms  have  recently  become serious  competitors  to  the  established
multinationals by offering considerably cheaper vehicles with designs and equipment
often comparable to the foreign models.  Such productive models  could,  for instance,
focus  on minimizing  input  costs—in particular,  the  labor  costs.  Or  they  can rely  on
increased share of sourcing from low-cost suppliers. They could also be based on product
architectures that simplify the product and, thereby, reduce production costs. And they
could, of course, combine several of these cost-reducing measures.
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3 In  our  study,  we  will  focus  on  two  companies:  Geely  from  China  and  Mahindra  &
Mahindra (hereinafter M&M) from India. Both carmakers, within the last decade, have
not only managed to attain relatively strong positions in their domestic markets, but
have also intensified their attempts to expand internationally.
4 Regarding our theoretical  perspective,  the following analysis  builds  on the notion of
“productive models” proposed by Boyer and Freyssenet (2002). Using this concept, we
will attempt to reconstruct the two carmakers’ low-cost productive models by focusing
on  their  three  major  aspects:  (1)  product  policies,  including  the  quality,  range,  and
architecture of the products offered by the two companies;  (2) productive organization,
referring to the firm-internal organization of production as well as supplier relations and
external service provision; and (3) labor relations, defined as the firms’ HRM and employee
voice policies. In addition, drawing on Boyer and Freyssenet (2002), we will consider the
viability of  the two studied productive models  within their  broader societal  contexts
regarding possible conflicts between the firms’ main stakeholders.
5 In our study, we develop three major arguments. First, we show that successful low-cost
productive  models  represent  specific  configuration  of  labor  relations,  productive
organization and product policies. This implies that simply focusing on low labor cost is
not  yet  a  viable  approach.  We further  argue that  the  development  of  such low-cost
productive models requires specific societal conditions regarding the demand structure
and  also  the  local  industrial  base.  Developing  relevant  and  sustainable  low-cost
productive  models  is  not  an  easy  task  for  the  indigenous  producers  from emerging
economies. This has been shown, for instance, by the spectacular fiasco of the Tata Nano
project—the  surprisingly  unpopular  Indian  “people’s  car”  (Nielsen  &  Wilhite,  2015;
Nieuwenhuis & Wells, 2015).
6 Second,  we emphasize  that  low-cost  productive  models  are  characterized by  specific
contradictions which drive companies towards an upgrading. The companies studied in
this paper view low-cost approaches as a transitional phase in the “fight for the middle”
(Brandt & Thun, 2010), which describes the growing competitive tensions between the
domestic and the multinational producers operating in the developing markets. Given the
lack of own product development, the domestic producers often have to rely on Western
engineering firms and suppliers, what makes it difficult to maintain a low-cost approach.
At the same time, we expect that the domestic companies from emerging economies,
while upgrading, will attempt to retain their cost advantages over the multinationals, for
instance  by  preserving  their  labor  regimes  or  cheap  local  supply  chains.  This  can,
however, easily result in a deadlock, especially if investments in new knowledge and skills
are neglected.
7 Our study uses the empirical material presented in Jürgens and Krzywdzinski (2013, 2016)
and seeks to exploratively reevaluate this research in light of the question about the
development of low-cost productive models in emerging markets.  The original  data—
consisting mainly of interviews with HR and production managers at the plants operated
by indigenous producers, local trade unionists, and car industry experts specializing in
emerging economies—was collected by Ulrich Jürgens and Martin Krzywdzinski within
the research project “Personnel and Production Systems in the BRIC Countries” (for a
more detailed description of the methods and data, see Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016, p.
19f). In the analysis presented here, we also used additional secondary sources, such as
company annual reports, trade press articles, or existing research literature.
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8 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, based on the
existing literature, we outline the external-societal conditions of the low-cost productive
models  designed  for  emerging  countries.  The  third  section  continues  the  literature
review  by  comparing  the  research  findings  regarding  low-cost  practices  of  the
established multinationals and the domestic producers from emerging economies. The
fourth section presents our analysis of the Geely case, whereas the fifth discusses the case
of M&M. In the final part of the article, we propose some general conclusions regarding
the trajectories of low-cost productive models in emerging economies.
 
Societal conditions of low-cost concepts in emerging
countries
9 In order to understand how low-cost productive models develop and are implemented in
emerging economies,  we  need to  take  into  account  various  institutional  and market
contexts  in  which  they  are  embedded.  Leaving  some  “degrees  of  freedom”,  such
contextual conditions largely determine the range of viable and sustainable approaches.
10 First, emerging economies like China and India can still be characterized as low-wage
locations. In such societal contexts, manufacturers are able to minimize their labor costs
by exploiting the abundance of cheap and highly motivated labor (see e.g. D’Costa, 2011;
Noble,  2013).  In addition,  governments in both countries  are willing to protect  their
emerging industries and thus tolerate the extensive use of temporary work, low wages,
and sometimes even violations of existing employment laws (Barnes, Das, & Pratap, 2016;
Ngai & Chan, 2012). This clears the path for low-cost strategies. But on the other hand,
radical “low-road” approaches to employment already provoke resistance of the local
workers – as has recently been observed in the case of both the Chinese and the Indian
automotive sectors (Barnes, 2017; Lüthje, 2014).
11 Second,  the  demand  structure  is  changing  in  both  China  and  India.  Middle-class
populations have grown significantly during the last  two decades,  and so have their
average incomes (Nag,  2015;  Wang,  2015).  And as  a  result,  the domestic  markets  for
durable goods, such as passenger cars, have expanded beyond the urban, managerial, and
political elites. But on the other hand, the purchasing power levels of these emerging
middle classes are still far below the levels typically found in highly developed countries.
This implies that members of  these groups will  usually not buy the expensive,  high-
quality products originating from mature markets.
12 This  recent  transformation  of  demand  has  affected  the  local  market  positions  of
established foreign carmakers and has opened a window of opportunity for domestic
manufacturers.  In  the  decades  following  their  entry  into  emerging  markets,
multinationals from Europe, the USA, and Japan adopted product strategies in India and
China that were organized around the “exportability” of the cars, which were designed
originally for mature markets (Jullien & Pardi, 2013). In the past, foreign companies in
most  cases  simply  remarketed  their  outdated  models  and  avoided  any  product
development targeted specifically at Indian or Chinese customers. An even less detached
strategy was to license off their outdated car models to local producers in the developing
countries.  Later,  the multinationals  did indeed decide to introduce various relatively
modern vehicles—like the VW Passat, launched in China in the year 2000 (Thun, 2006);
these, however, were still designed primarily for developed countries and could only be
The inevitability of change in Chinese and Indian automakers’ low cost produc...
La nouvelle revue du travail, 12 | 2018
3
afforded  by  a  small  share  of  customers  in  emerging  economies.  The  new  demand
structure,  which  meant  that  broader  middle-class  groups  aspired  to  car  ownership,
presented the multinationals with a serious challenge. If they wanted to capture a part of
the rapidly growing market for affordable cars, they had to develop designs dedicated to
needs of the emerging markets.
13 And third, the transformation in the demand has been accompanied by a maturing of the
local industrial base. Both China and India have tried to stimulate the development of
local productive capabilities. Since the early 2000s, the Indian government has, on the
one hand, allowed fully foreign-owned subsidiaries in the automotive sector, but, on the
other, upheld very high tariffs for imported vehicles—with the overall duty exceeding
100% of the car value (Tiwari & Herstatt, 2014). In China, the central government has set
the tariff barriers at a moderately high level of 25% (with additional duties on imports
from  selected  countries)  and,  at  the  same  time,  maintained  the  50-percent  foreign
ownership limit for investments by multinational OEMs (Noble, 2013). The sustained high
tariff and nontariff barriers put the multinational companies under pressure to establish
local production facilities. As a result,  a relatively well-developed manufacturing base
emerged,  which  created a  “latecomer  advantage”  (D’Costa,  2016)  for  the  indigenous
producers.
 
Varieties of low-cost productive models
14 Our analysis assumes that the multinational and the emerging economies carmakers face
different opportunities and obstacles to develop relevant low-cost productive models in
the  emerging  markets.  This  is  related,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  different  industrial
capabilities and organizational routines accumulated by these companies. We will refer to
the efforts of the multinational producers to decrease their usual production costs and
make their cars more price-competitive as the “top-down” low-cost model. In contrast, the
attempts of the indigenous firms to secure a large share in the changing local car markets
by upgrading their productive capabilities will be labeled the “bottom-up” model.
 
The “top-down” approach
15 The  traditional  low-cost  approaches  used  by  multinational  carmakers  in  developing
countries relied on the production of older cars (or the licensing of their production to
local firms) that were no longer being sold in the mature markets. Production equipment
(along with many car parts) was often shipped from the sites in the mature markets to
developing economies. The economic logic behind this model was that the development
and production-equipment costs had already been amortized. A prime example of this
strategy  is  the  Santana  model,  which  was  manufactured  by  Volkswagen  in  China.
Whereas production of the Santana ceased in 1988 in the original European market, the
model was manufactured in China for another 25 years (1985–2013),  with only minor
technological and stylistic improvements (Chin, 2010). A more recent example of such a
strategy seems to be General Motor’s Baojun brand, designed primarily for the Chinese
market. The company’s initial car (Baojun 630), was based on older GM models (Nam,
2015).  And importantly,  the company’s  production facility  was located not  in one of
China’s highly industrialized coastal areas – usually chosen by multinational carmakers
(Lüthje & Tian, 2015) – but in Guanxi, a less developed and low-wage region within China.
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16 Due to the transformation of emerging economies described above, the last two decades
have seen the emergence of new low-cost approaches. In recent years, some Western
multinational carmakers have tried to introduce low-cost concepts designed especially –
or at  least  primarily – for emerging markets.  Willing to diversify their local  product
offerings beyond the top and middle segments of the market, the multinationals decided
to launch either wholly dedicated “no-frills” brands or single low-cost models.
17 One particularly successful example of this approach is Renault’s Dacia. The brand’s first
car model, the Logan, was a huge marketing success in many emerging countries (e.g.
Russia);  and,  it  was  introduced also  to  several  mature  markets.  It  was  a  remarkable
phenomenon  given  the  failure  of  many  other  products  developed  by  Triade
manufacturers  for  the  emerging  economies  (Dunford,  2009).  Renault’s  particular
capabilities in developing dedicated low-cost models were underlined by the huge success
of the Kwid, the company’s low cost car for India (Midler et al., 2017).
18 Existing empirical analyses of Dacia’s productive model point to various elements that
contributed to the company’s success as a producer of affordable “good-enough” cars.
1. Product  architecture:  According  to  Jullien  et  al.  (2013),  the  Dacia  approach  to  product
architecture departed from the established Renault practices by prioritizing simplification.
Achieving the final-price target of 5,000 euros per car required a disciplined “design-to-
cost” approach. In this respect, Dacia went a step further than the Toyota model, which
traditionally  emphasized architectural  standardization in order  to  limit  technological  or
marketing risks (Boyer & Freyssenet, 2000). In addition, the success of Dacia’s productive
model is also grounded in the parent company’s industrial capabilities. This is indicated by
the fact that Logan designers have reused parts and components from various pre-existing
car  models  by  Renault  or  Nissan  –  and  in  this  way,  were  able  to  bring  down  Logan’s
development costs.
2. Process organization: The organization of production at Dacia’s factory is based on a low-
investment approach and focuses largely on manual work.
3. Supply chain: Very important for the Dacia’s success were Renault’s customary suppliers.
The company decided to outsource an unusually large part of activities (Jullien et al., 2013).
And being unable to identify a sufficient number of reliable local producers in Romania, the
management decided to involve in the project Renault’s suppliers, like Faurecia or Valeo,
urging them to locate production facilities in Romania.
4. And  finally,  it  was  observed  that  the  company  follows  a  “low-road”  approach  to
employment. For instance, workers’ wages are kept very low – at about 30% of Renault’s
average pay levels in Turkey, and at about 10% of what the company’s Spanish workers earn
(Jullien et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, this “low-road” strategy has led to conflicts between
the management and the local workers (Adascalitei & Guga, 2016).
19 Other  multinationals  have  been  far  less  successful  in  developing  emerging-market
product strategies. One example is the VW Gol produced by the German multinational in
Brazil and marketed in various Latin American countries. The Gol was developed at the
VW’s local facilities by integrating components from VW’s other models, the Golf and the
Polo, into a new, simplified product architecture. The use of the parent company’s pre-
existing  designs,  components  as  well  as  production  equipment  allowed  a  significant
reduction  of  production  and  development  costs.  In  difference  to  the  Renault  case,
however, the Gol was born from local initiative and never fully enjoyed support from the
company’s headquarters. VW never developed a successful systematic low-cost strategy
for emerging economies.  Due to lack of follow-up investments,  the Gol started losing
market shares in Brazil. VW’s failure in the low-cost segment despite several attempts in
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20 The “bottom-up”  approach  characterizes  strategies  of  domestic  manufacturers  from
emerging economies. One particularly radical approach was evident in the case of the
Tata Nano. The Nano was marketed as “the world’s cheapest car” with a final-price goal
of approximately 1,400 euros. This was based on a radical simplification of the product
architecture, the low wage cost in Tata’s Indian operations, and very limited investment
in new product development. The engine and all major components were purchased from
multinational suppliers (Schuster & Holtbrügge, 2011).
21 In contrast, various Chinese manufacturers have pursued a different approach. Of course,
the first element of their productive models is the specific labor relations based on the
use of low-wage work, high shares of precarious employment, and the lack of a labor
interest representation. Extant literature emphasizes, however, a second element which
is  a  radical  shift  in the product  architecture,  from a closed design (be it  integral  or
modular) to an open modular design (Fujimoto, 2002, 2007). A closed design means that a
single lead firm controls all the interface specifications between parts and components;
this grants it a position at the top of a hierarchical supplier network. If the interfaces
between parts are mainly product specific, the design can be called closed integral. If
there are standardized interfaces across different products of the firm, the design can be
called  closed  modular.  Open modular  product  design,  by  contrast,  means  that  the
standardization of interfaces between parts and components is defined at the industry
level.
22 According to Wang (2008, 2009) and Fujimoto (2002), the open (or quasi-open) modular
product architecture was developed by domestic Chinese manufacturers as a response to
the huge technology gap between them and companies from Triade countries. It built on
the  relatively  low levels  of  intellectual  property  protection  in  China,  which  allowed
domestic companies to reverse-engineer foreign car models. Parts and components were
purchased from foreign companies’  original  suppliers  or  from Chinese suppliers  that
copied the original design. In order to avoid intellectual property rights conflicts, Chinese
companies tried to slightly modify the cars, often by integrating parts and components
from other manufacturers’ car models. Wang (2008) uses the notion of the (quasi) open
product architecture to describe this copying and recombination strategy. The term quasi
indicates that this approach was born from improvisation and did not rely on formal
inter-company  standardization  processes.  This  approach  facilitated  a  much  higher
involvement  of  Chinese  low-cost  suppliers  than  was  and  is  practiced  by  foreign
companies in China (Brandt & Thun, 2010, p. 1562). As Holweg, Luo, and Oliver (2009)
argue,  domestic  Chinese  suppliers  still  lag  far  behind  foreign  companies  regarding
productivity and quality, but they draw their advantages from very low labor cost. The
vehicles developed in this way could be offered on the market for prices between 5,000
and 10,000 euros, and they were often very similar to their foreign equivalents without
achieving the same levels of quality and performance.
23 We can summarize this literature review in three points. First, the low-cost approaches of
car manufacturers from emerging economies build on major societal transformations: the
rise of new middle classes in the emerging economies and their increasing demand for
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cars, the possibilities for companies to rely on low wage work, and the strong industrial
base  of  suppliers  and  service  providers  which  has  been  created  by  multinational
companies operating in the emerging economies. Second, the existing low-cost strategies
rely  on  a  combination  of  new  simplified  product  architectures,  low-cost  production
organization, and low wages. It does not seem sustainable to build a low-cost strategy on
low wages only. Third, the low-cost strategies differ according to the type of the company
and the institutional context.
 
The case of Geely
24 Geely was founded in 1986 and today has three divisions: automotive, educational, and
hospitality. The automotive division employed 18,000 persons in 2016. Geely is the only
completely private Chinese automotive company—an exception in an automotive sector
dominated by traditional, state-owned companies. It is seen as the prime example of a
successful  low-cost  domestic  Chinese  producer.  Yet,  based  on  the  Geely  case  study
presented in Jürgens and Krzywdzinski (2016) and on insights from other existing studies
(e.g. Balcet, Wang, & Richet, 2012; Wang, 2008) we argue that the company’s trajectory
shows serious limitations of the “low-cost” approach.
 
Product policy
25 Geely started as an automotive manufacturer by producing and selling a copy version of
the FAW Xiali, which was already a copy of the Japanese Daihatsu Charade (Wang, 2008).
This was followed by further car models that imitated foreign automobiles. All those cars
were sold at much cheaper prices than those of Geely’s foreign competitors.
26 This  strategy  relied  on  reverse  engineering  and a  (quasi)  open product  architecture
(Wang, 2008),  which, according to Wang and Kimble (2013) Geely is utilizing up until
today.  For  instance,  Geely’s  cars  are  designed  to  be  compatible  with  engines  from
different producers. Other car modules are also designed to be able to use parts from
different sources and thus reduce costs.
27 We argue, however, that this approach is only a transition phase for Geely, which it is
deploying while the company builds up its own product development capabilities and
seeks to offer more sophisticated car models. The creation of the Emgrand brand was the
first step in this direction: Emgrand was meant to be positioned above the Geely brand
regarding price and quality. Nevertheless, the Emgrand cars have remained based on a
(quasi) open architecture: Many components look like imitations of Japanese products, in
particular of the Toyota Camry.
28 This  approach,  however,  did  not  lend  itself  to  producing  cars  with  a  quality  and
performance  similar  to  those  made  by  Geely’s  Japanese,  European,  or  American
competitors. Geely therefore turned to an acquisition strategy in order to grow out of the
low-cost  market  segment  (Balcet  et  al.  2012).  In  2006,  the  company  set  a  target  of
achieving  “technology  leadership,”  which  implies  developing  its  own  product
development  capabilities  (Balcet  et  al.,  2012,  p.  372).  In  2009, Geely  acquired  the
Australian transmission producer Drive-Train Systems International (DSI). An important
step towards upgrading was the acquisition of  the Swedish automobile manufacturer
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Volvo in 2010, which was intended to facilitate a systematic technology transfer to China
(Alvstam & Ivarsson, 2014; Balcet, 2014; Balcet et al., 2012).
 
Productive organization
29 As Wang (2008) describes,  Geely started with very low degree of  vertical  integration.
Engines and transmissions were bought from other companies, in particular from Toyota
and its suppliers. When Toyota increased the prices for its engines, Geely invested in
building up its own R&D unit, which developed its own engine based on Toyota’s products
through reverse engineering. With the acquisition of DSI, Geely also started producing
transmission systems in house.
30 Given that the major condition for offering low-cost cars is to purchase low-cost parts
and components, the dominant criterion for supplier selection at Geely is price (Wang,
2008,  p.  525).  Around half  of  Geely’s  suppliers  are  small  and  medium sized  Chinese
companies providing simple low cost parts – a much larger share than in the case of
foreign car manufacturers in China. Even Geely, however, has to rely on larger suppliers
producing also for foreign automotive manufacturers for other parts and components.
31 In  the  following,  we  will  describe  Geely’s  own  production  organization,  taking  the
example of the Ningbo plant (see Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016). The plant exhibits clear
characteristics of lean production such as standardized work, Kanban systems, Andon
systems  etc.  Geely  managers  visited  Toyota  plants  in  order  to  learn  about  Toyota
production system.
32 The automation level of the Ningbo plant is low. In the body shop, about 25% of the tasks
were automated at  the time of  our  study,  which is  considerably  below the levels  of
automotive plants in Europe or Japan. Most of the welding was still done manually. In the
assembly shop, only windshield installation was automated. Automation however is not
at the focus of lean production systems anyway, and Geely seemed to set out for a full
scale implementation of the system at the time of our research. This implied using the
line-stop system which had been installed which meant an empowerment of the rank and
file workers at least to a certain degree.
 
Labor relations
33 The employment relations partially conformed to the expected low-cost approach. The
Ningbo plant recruits workers from vocational high schools in rural areas in Shandong
and other provinces, who then move to live in Geely’s own dormitories. In a city like
Ningbo they usually receive the hukou (the registration which gives them access to the
social services of the city like schools, health care, kindergartens etc.; see Cheng & Selden
1994)  if  they  have  an  employment  contract  and  an  apartment.  The  provision  of
dormitories  is  hence  an  important  precondition  for  receiving  the  hukou.  Research
literature  emphasizes,  however,  also  the  role  of  dormitories  in  China  as  part  of  a
paternalistic  workplace regime (Ngai  & Smith,  2007),  but  we could not  examine this
argument in the case of Geely in more detail. The workers receive two successive fixed-
term contracts, which sum up to ten years in total. Temporary agency workers are used
as a flexibility buffer when demand fluctuates. In 2010, agency workers represented 8% of
the Ningbo plant employees.
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34 Recruiting workers from poor rural areas and providing accommodation in dormitories
are the foundations for a low wage level. The entry-level wage for workers is 10% above
the minimum wage in the province. As Figure 1 shows, the average wage in the Zhejiang
automotive industry (Geely is  the main automotive manufacturer in Zhejiang)  lies  at
around 50% of the wage level in the Shanghai automotive industry, where Volkswagen
and General Motors are located, and at around 80% of the wage level in Guangdong, one
of the main locations of the Japanese car manufacturers in China.
 
Figure 1: Monthly average wages (CNY) in the automobile industry in selected regions, 2014
Source: authors, based on NBS (2014, p. 173). In 2014, 1,000 Chinese Yuan corresponded to about
133 Euros.
35 The trade union at Geely limits itself to the traditional tasks of organizing social and
cultural activities for workers, supporting workers in the event of sickness, family-related
problems, and difficult personal situations, and promoting collective spirit and dedication
to work.  There is no collective bargaining,  and consequently,  there is no pressure to
increase wages as long as the supply of workers from rural areas does not end.
36 The low wage level certainly is one of the main reasons for the high labor turnover in the
Ningbo plant. In the years after the plant’s founding, labor turnover reached around 40%
per year. This is a problem for the company, which invests considerable resources in skill
formation.  Production  workers  are  recruited  from  secondary  vocational  schools.  All
workers start with a ten-day introductory training; this introduction is followed by a
week  of  fundamental  skills  training,  which  is  an  introduction  to  the  principles  of
standardized work and in the basic tasks in their future production area. After this, the
workers complete on-the-job training. Geely has designed a special process for the on-
the-job training. Each new worker is assigned a mentor and there is a “contract” between
worker and mentor, which makes the mentor responsible for successful training (see also
Jürgens & Krzywdzinski 2015).
37 Skilled workers employed in maintenance and other indirect areas are recruited from
Geely’s own vocational colleges. The company has established its own education division,
which runs the Beijing Geely University, the Geely Sanya College at Hainan University,
the Zhejiang Automotive Vocational College, and the Zhejiang Institute of Automotive
Engineering. Some educational programs at these institutions are explicitly modeled on
German vocational education concepts. In 2010, Geely received the “Model Enterprise of
Vocational Education of the Chinese Automotive Industry” award.
38 The case of Geely shows the potential but also the limits of a low-cost approach. Based on
a (quasi) open product architecture, high reliance on low cost suppliers, and a low-cost
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model of employment relationships, Geeely has succeeded in winning market share and
establishing  itself  as  a  competitive  automotive  manufacturer.  Further  growth—
particularly in the more profitable middle and upper segments of the automotive market
—will require the company to build up own product development capabilities. Geely is
trying to achieve this by making acquisitions and creating its own R&D units and training
institutes. The decreasing reliance on reverse engineering implies a shift towards closed
product architectures and requires the company to invest in skill formation, not only in
its engineering departments, but also in production. Low wages and high labor turnover
seem inappropriate given these aims and we might expect the company to modify its
wage policy in the long term.
 
The case of Mahindra & Mahindra
39 Established in 1945 as  a  steel  trading company,  today M&M is  one of  India’s  largest
family-owned conglomerates,  with around 200,000 employees and multiple operations
worldwide.  Apart  from passenger cars,  the  firm’s  automotive division  also  produces
tractors,  two-wheelers,  heavy equipment,  and parts.  Since the early 2000s,  M&M has
experienced a  period of  rapid growth and has  made various acquisitions.  In 2011,  it
acquired SsangYong, a Korean SUV manufacturer. One year earlier, it decided to enter the
electric vehicle market by taking over the Indian firm Reva.
 
Product policy
40 M&M has a long tradition as an automotive producer. It entered the automotive business
in 1947 as an assembler of jeeps for the Indian market under license from Willys. More
recently, M&M made its first attempts to enter passenger car production. In the 1990s
and 2000s, it was a contract manufacturer for Ford (Ford Escort) and Renault (Logan) and
accumulated  some  initial  experience  in  passenger  car  production  (see  Jürgens  &
Krzywdzinski, 2013, p. 120). However, due to weak sales of the assembled models, the
cooperation ended only a few years after its launch.
41 In the early 2000s, M&M started producing the Scorpio, its first “urban” SUV targeted at
domestic middle-class consumers—a product based on the company’s expertise with jeeps
and other utility vehicles. The product strategy was a different to that of Geely. While
Geely initially concentrated on small cars, M&M has established itself in the sub-segment
of SUVs, by positioning its cars as cheap and “good-enough” alternatives to the models
offered by Western and Japanese MNCs. Currently, the company offers a diverse range of
vehicles  in this  segment.  Here,  the low-cost  strategy does not  mean focusing on the
“cheapest” market segment, but rather competing with foreign manufacturers in more
demanding  segments  by  offering  products  that  are  more  price-competitive.  A  good
example here is the XUV500, launched by the company in 2011, with a starting price of
about 18,000 US dollars (around half of the price of a foreign SUV). While this strategy
worked relatively well in India, the company’s hopes to export its cars (Karmali, 2011)
were largely disappointed.
42 Regarding  product  development,  M&M’s  strategy  exhibits  both  similarities  and
differences  to  the  strategy  employed  by  Geely.  First  of  all,  like  Geely,  M&M had  to
overcome  the  problem of  its  insufficient  product  development  capabilities.  Whereas
Geely dealt with the issue through reverse engineering, this approach was not possible in
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India given its stricter intellectual property regulation. M&M thus decided to delegate the
more demanding engineering tasks to suppliers and specialized engineering companies.
Its own development team comprised a mere 120 engineers, who were responsible for the
general exterior design and module specification. The majority of the key components
(engine,  transmission,  but  also  the  interior)  used  in  the  Scorpio  were  developed
externally (Wielgat, 2002). Since M&M pressured the suppliers to reduce development
and tooling costs, many components were not designed specifically for the new model,
but were based on existing designs (Wielgat, 2002). The literature refers to this latter
strategy as M&M’s “capability to recombine”—including a possible reutilization of the
existing components in the company’s other models (Sharmelly & Ray, 2016).
43 Similar to Geely, however, M&M has continuously upgraded its in-house development
capabilities. For instance, the engines used in the early versions of its SUVs were simply
purchased from multinational companies like Peugeot or Renault. A few years later, the
company  assigned  the  engineering  consultant  AVL  to  design  a  series  of  new  diesel
engines.  Given that  engineering services  are  not  cheap,  M&M set  up its  own engine
development  center  in  Chennai  in  2012—as  part  of  the  larger  “Mahindra  Research




44 As mentioned above, the company delegates a large part of component development to
suppliers. Producers from developing or newly industrialized countries play an important
role in the supply network. For instance, in the case of the Scorpio, M&M decided to
delegate  the  suspension  development  and  production  to  a  Korean  component
manufacturer that had no prior experience with suspension systems; this manufacturer
hired Japanese experts for this project. The majority of parts are supplied by plants in
India or Asia, a practice that makes the low-cost approach feasible.
45 Let us take a closer look at the organization of production at M&M’s own factories by
focusing  on  the  Chakan  plant,  officially  inaugurated  in  2010  (see  also  Jürgens  &
Krzywdzinski, 2016). The facility is a part of the Chakan Special Economic Zone, situated
in close proximity to the city  of  Pune.  The Chakan plant  began operations with the
production of a mini truck and larger commercial vehicles, and later, in 2011, became the
main plant responsible for production of the urban-market oriented XUV500. Between
2011 and 2016,  the factory manufactured on average about 120,000 vehicles annually
(Mahindra & Mahindra, 2014, 2016).
46 As Jürgens and Krzywdzinski (2013) emphasize, M&M used its joint ventures with Ford
and Renault as well as visiting programs for executives at Toyota in Japan to develop
expertise in lean manufacturing—the Chakan plant shows the clear influence of these
concepts (e.g.,  emphasis on teamwork and employee involvement in problem solving,
standardized work, installation of a line-stop system). But at the same time, there seems
to be an even stronger focus on low-cost solutions here than in the case of Geely. The
level of automation remains very low—in the body shop it was at only 12%, which is not
only far below the European standards, but also less than in typical Chinese automotive
plants. In a press interview (AMS, 2010), a senior manager at M&M commented on the
company’s approach to the Chakan plant’s design, and in particular regarding automation
at the body shop, as follows: “We looked into ‘frugal’ manufacturing and have achieved a
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judicious balance of men, equipment and automation […] There is a very healthy mix of




47 At first glance, the employment relations at M&M appear to be organized around the idea
of  minimizing labor costs  by taking advantage of  local  labor market  conditions.  The
factory recruits very young workers (maximum age 27), and predominantly from rural
area, which can be seen as a strategy to achieve a high level of workforce motivation at
relatively low wages. The management sees it as an element of the company’s corporate
social  responsibility  policy  to  include  disadvantaged  social  groups  in  its  workforce
(Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes,  Other  Backward  Classes;  see  Jürgens  &
Krzywdzinski, 2016, pp. 102, 107). If all goes well the policy can serve to build up a loyal
workforce.  We find an interesting twist  here  where regarding the use  of  a  low cost
strategy as part of a CSR policy.
48 The fact that the plant is localized in a Special Economic Zone, which gives the company
additional flexibility regarding the scheduling of working times and overtime work (see
e.g. Parwez, 2015). A clear indication of a low-cost approach to labor at the Chakan plant
(or more precisely,  at  Mahindra Vehicle Manufacturing Ltd.)  is  the use of  temporary
employment  (Figure  2).  In  2015–16,  the  plant  employed  around  3,000  permanent
employees and around 7,000 people on temporary contracts (mainly agency workers and
other  contractors)  (Mahindra  &  Mahindra,  2015).  There  are  several  potential
explanations for this extraordinarily high share of temporary employment and it is not
clear if it will remain stable in the future. First, it might be a deliberate strategy aiming at
exploiting low wage cost. Such strategies are common in the Indian automotive sector
(Barnes, Lal Das, & Pratap, 2015; Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016, p. 99). Second, it could be
a  temporary  phenomenon  due  to  rising  production  levels,  which  will  result  in  an
increasing number of permanent employees if production stabilizes at a high level. Third,
it  could be a statistical  effect of  organizational restructuring e.g.,  if  activities relying
mainly on temporary work (logistics, pre-assembly of certain components etc.) were now
included in the reporting. Given that this increase in temporary employment occurred
after our interviews in the Chakan plant, we cannot identify the main reason here.
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Figure 2: Employment structure at Mahindra Vehicle Manufacturers Ltd., 2011-2016
49 The reliance on the extensive use of  temporary labor seems compatible with M&M’s
approach to skill formation for production workers. The recruitment requirements for
production workers are low: The company does not necessarily expect recruits to have
completed secondary school. There is an onboarding program of three weeks including a
basic introduction into automotive manufacturing, and a one-week training program in
fundamental  skills  in  a  special  shop-floor  facility.  Regarding  skilled  workers  for
maintenance and other functions requiring higher qualifications or experience, relies on
hiring  experienced  skilled  workers  from the  external  labor  market  or  directly  from
Industrial  Training Institutes (ITIs)  or  polytechnics (Jürgens & Krzywdzinski,  2016,  p.
103). The company collaborates with two ITIs in the Pune region and takes their students
as interns. However, in India it is common practice to deploy such interns as cheap labor
on the line—it is unclear whether this is also the case at M&M. At the time of our study,
the company lacked an own structured vocational educational program.
50 While M&M does not perceive a high level of technical skills as a necessary requirement
for  production  workers,  the  employee  development  practices  at  M&M  point  in  the
direction of a high investment orientation towards skills. The company has an ambitious
system  of  employee  development  based  on  long-term  Work  Life  Plans  (Jürgens  &
Krzywdzinski,  2016,  p.  165f).  It  provides  scholarships  for  workers  who are willing to
study. These measures are meant to develop the “high potentials” and future supervisors
on the shop floor, since tertiary-level qualifications are a prerequisite for supervisory
positions.
51 Industrial relations in the Chakan plant are complicated. The company initially tried to
prevent  the establishment of  a  union;  instead,  it  invested in various forms of  direct
communication with the employees, like monthly departmental meetings or employee
surveys (Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016, p. 295f). Eventually, however, an internal union
was  indeed  established  in  the  factory;  but  its  position—as  became  apparent  on  the
occasion  of  wage  disputes  at  the  plant  in  2014—was  not  uncontested  among  the
workforce (The Indian Express, 2014). Ongoing tensions between management and labor
over  wages  and employment  conditions,  expressed  in  the  form of  various  collective
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actions, have been observed at M&M’s domestic plants throughout the last several years
(see e.g. Galib, Munny, & Lin, 2011; ITUC, 2013).
52 M&M pursues a specific low-cost approach: it does not aim to produce cheap, simple cars,
but rather to offer SUVs at a much lower price than its established competitors from
Europe, the USA, or Japan. Given that it lacks its own product development capabilities,
the first pillar of M&M’s productive model was its reliance on engineering service firms
for all  major product development tasks—which was not cheap.  The company’s price
competitiveness was built on the cooperation with Asian low-cost suppliers and a low-
cost approach to labor in its own Indian factories. This strategy worked well on the Indian
market—at least until the recent slowdown in the whole Indian automotive industry; but
M&M has, as yet, not been able to achieve success in more developed export markets,
where consumer quality expectations are higher. The company’s productive model is far
from  stable.  On  the  one  hand,  the  company  has  tried  to  create  its  own  product
development capabilities and to reduce its reliance on external engineering firms. On the
other hand, although the management has made significant efforts to retain its skilled
workforce,  the  company’s  employees  are  contesting  their  low wages  and  precarious
employment and could challenge this element of the low-cost strategy.
 
Conclusions
53 We started from the insight that three major transformations in emerging economies
have  radically  changed  the  conditions  for  the  development  of  domestic  car
manufacturers.  First,  increasing incomes of  middle classes have changed the demand
structure of automotive markets and created a window of opportunity for new entrants
in the industry. Second, the wages of workers remain relatively low and allow companies
to pursue low-cost strategies. Third, car manufacturers from emerging economies benefit
from the relatively strong industrial base of suppliers and service providers which has
been created by foreign multinationals.
54 We examined two cases of low-cost automotive manufacturers from China and India. The
manufacturers  from  emerging  economies  have  entered  the  new  competition  with
significant disadvantages compared to companies from the Triade: They lack established
brand names, technologies, and product development capabilities, and they do not have
the same economies of scale. Their productive models combine several elements allowing
them to offer  products  much more cheaply than the incumbents.  In  both cases,  the
companies have used (quasi)  open product architectures in order to expand low-cost
sourcing from domestic suppliers in emerging economies and to allow the use of parts
designed for other car models. Geely tried to overcome its lack of product development
experience via  reverse  engineering (which was  possible  due to  the  loose  intellectual
property rights regime in China) while M&M almost entirely outsourced development to
engineering  firms  and  suppliers.  Both  companies  have  also  built  their  price
competitiveness on low wages and the extensive use of temporary employment.
55 Our analysis shows, however, that neither company aims to specialize in low-cost models.
Their approaches rather can be understood as a first step in the “fight for the middle”
(Brandt & Thun, 2010) i.e., for the middle segments of the automotive markets. Geely
started out as a producer of  small,  cheap cars,  but is  increasingly moving into more
sophisticated market segments. M&M has focused on the SUV market from the start.
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56 We argue that one of the drivers of this upgrading is the lack of long-term sustainability
of low-cost approaches. Both Geely and M&M are trying to build up their own product
development capabilities in order to overcome the limits of reverse engineering (Geely)
and the high cost and dependencies of the cooperation with engineering service firms
(M&M).
57 A particularly important fact is that both firms are confronted with contradictions in
their labor relations. In order to improve quality and productivity, they are investing in
skill formation. The firms’ orientation on lean production concepts contributes to moving
away from low-cost strategies.  It  requires training regarding quality control  systems,
continuous improvement activities,  and the functioning of  the production systems in
general.  This contradicts the low-wage policy,  which has created high labor turnover
(Geely) or labor disputes (M&M). Labor relations are perhaps the most serious threat to
the stability of both productive models. It might be that these contradictions will drive
both companies to abandon the low-cost approach.
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ABSTRACTS
In emerging economies, social change and fast growth have created new automotive markets and
a demand for relatively inexpensive, “modern-enough” cars. Up-and-coming local manufacturers
and established companies from the Triad countries are competing for dominance in these vast
market segments. The paper examines the productive models developed in this context by two
indigenous carmakers, one from China (Geely) and the other from India (Mahindra & Mahindra).
A variety of tensions are revealed within the two models, relating in particular to labour policies.
Both models seek to combine low wages and a reliance on low-cost supply chains with simplified
product architectures. Their stability is fragile, however, with one solution involving employee
upskilling to increase productive system efficiency.
En las economías emergentes, el cambio social y el rápido crecimiento han dado origen a nuevos
mercados de automóviles, y a una demanda de automóviles relativamente poco caros y bastante
modernos. Los fabricantes locales y las empresas extranjeras están en competencia para dominar
esos  vastos  segmentos  del  mercado.  El  artículo  se  enfoca  en  los  modelos  productivos
desarrollados en este contexto por dos fabricantes de automóviles nativos, uno de China y otro de
India. El análisis revela diversas tensiones en el seno de estos modelos, en particular en torno a
las  políticas  de  mano de obra.  Los  dos  modelos  buscan combinar  salarios  bajos  y  cadena de
suministro  a  bajos  costos,  con  arquitecturas  de  producto  simplificadas.  Sin  embargo,  su
estabilidad es muy relativa; una de las soluciones pasa por la cualificación de los asalariados para
mejorar la eficacia de los sistemas productivos.
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